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The extern "C"
ABI of SIMD vector types depends on target features (tracking issue for abi_unsupported_vector_types
future-incompatibility lint)
#116558
Comments
For a hard error, I think it probably should go through RFC. I can start drafting that now. As for what it would check, I'd expect a hard error on any time a simd type is passed by value and the appropriate feature is unavailable, even if the specific ABI wouldn't necessarily pass it in registers, including inside a structure, and the lint should probably check the same thing. |
That can have potentially surprising effects, e.g. when a closure captures something of type It also means adding adding a private field that contains by-val |
This would already be the case with replacing several fields with a SIMD type. For example, changing Although thinking about it, because features can be per-crate, this might be a problem on crates that specialize based on target features. Perhaps |
With RISC-V, you have |
But the ABI only changes when So that sounds like whether or not |
No, that is exactly it. Do I understand correctly that you essentially want to do something similar to |
I'm not an expert on target details. 🙈 Usually my purview ends when I have given precise abstract semantics to nasty pieces of unsafe Rust and MIR.^^ But every now and then terrible low-level CPU nightmares creep onto my territory and then I have to learn how to deal with them... So, I don't know what ARM does with eabi vs eabihf. But it sounds like they are considering "hard float" and "soft float" two different ABIs that presumably use different registers for argument passing (so they are indeed different ABIs), and then have corresponding target triples to tell apart the ABIs. So yeah that sounds like what I am suggesting we should do for other targets as well. (We could also consider different ABI strings, like "C" vs "C-softfloat" or so. No idea if that makes any sense.) Obviously we don't actually care whether the functions behind those ABIs use x87/d/f hardware instructions or do some softfloat stuff, we just care how arguments are passed. But sadly it seems that in LLVM, there's no way to say "you have the This may all be completely naive since I'm just coming at this with my principled approach of making everything safe or at least sound and giving it semantics at a high level; I rely on people like @chorman0773 to tell me when my ideas make no sense "in the field". ;) |
If |
Yeah for the Rust ABI we do apply a work-around (it always passes such types in memory), so that call is fine. But the combination of (I updated the example to actually use the Rust ABI for |
Would adding a EDIT: The referenced Note
|
Inlining should be aware of target features, so Yes such an intermediate Rust ABI function works around the problem successfully. But the fundamental problem remains with function pointers: we have to decide whether an |
Ah, the |
The compiler does report |
And that's supposed to be just a warning. We should hard error if we know everything is fucked and there's no salvaging the compilation (whether hard erroring is appropriate here, I don't know yet). |
There's no C code involved here so I would argue it is reasonable to silence the lint for the example. The lint talks about FFI, but the example does no FFI, this is all Rust-to-Rust calls. |
Is there an example that can trigger this with only FFI-safe types though? |
I've actually suppressed that lint for |
I don't think If we did anything with ABI based on |
@briansmith our ctypes lints seem to have enough gaps to be easily circumvented; here's a reproducer that the lint doesn't catch. It's using a closure to pass the value -- closures that capture a single field are newtypes around that field so they get the field's ABI, but the improper-ctypes lint ignores closures. |
More to the point, there's no formal definition of "FFI-safe" and "FFI-unsafe" in the Rust language. As far as I can tell, the actual thing that bears the obligation to be ABI-correct is when you do extern "C" {
fn c_func(arg: SomeType) -> ReturnType;
}
fn rust_func() -> ReturnType {
let arg = SomeType::random();
// here, the Rust caller actually discharges the obligation...
// which is honestly slightly unfortunate:
// in real scenarios, we might not be the author of the `extern "C"` block!
unsafe { c_func(arg) }
} |
Do we know if clang is doing anything clever here? I assume C has exactly the same problem, since their function types don't track target features either. |
clang does not fix this issue. See llvm-project#64706 |
That's a different issue (mismatch with GCC). This here is about mismatch within code compiled by the same compiler, but with different locally set target features. |
Stabilize target_feature_11 # Stabilization report This is an updated version of rust-lang#116114, which is itself a redo of rust-lang#99767. Most of this commit and report were copied from those PRs. Thanks `@LeSeulArtichaut` and `@calebzulawski!` ## Summary Allows for safe functions to be marked with `#[target_feature]` attributes. Functions marked with `#[target_feature]` are generally considered as unsafe functions: they are unsafe to call, cannot *generally* be assigned to safe function pointers, and don't implement the `Fn*` traits. However, calling them from other `#[target_feature]` functions with a superset of features is safe. ```rust // Demonstration function #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn avx2() {} fn foo() { // Calling `avx2` here is unsafe, as we must ensure // that AVX is available first. unsafe { avx2(); } } #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn bar() { // Calling `avx2` here is safe. avx2(); } ``` Moreover, once rust-lang#135504 is merged, they can be converted to safe function pointers in a context in which calling them is safe: ```rust // Demonstration function #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn avx2() {} fn foo() -> fn() { // Converting `avx2` to fn() is a compilation error here. avx2 } #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn bar() -> fn() { // `avx2` coerces to fn() here avx2 } ``` See the section "Closures" below for justification of this behaviour. ## Test cases Tests for this feature can be found in [`tests/ui/target_feature/`](https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/tree/f6cb952dc115fd1311b02b694933e31d8dc8b002/tests/ui/target-feature). ## Edge cases ### Closures * [target-feature 1.1: should closures inherit target-feature annotations? rust-lang#73631](rust-lang#73631) Closures defined inside functions marked with #[target_feature] inherit the target features of their parent function. They can still be assigned to safe function pointers and implement the appropriate `Fn*` traits. ```rust #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn qux() { let my_closure = || avx2(); // this call to `avx2` is safe let f: fn() = my_closure; } ``` This means that in order to call a function with #[target_feature], you must guarantee that the target-feature is available while the function, any closures defined inside it, as well as any safe function pointers obtained from target-feature functions inside it, execute. This is usually ensured because target features are assumed to never disappear, and: - on any unsafe call to a `#[target_feature]` function, presence of the target feature is guaranteed by the programmer through the safety requirements of the unsafe call. - on any safe call, this is guaranteed recursively by the caller. If you work in an environment where target features can be disabled, it is your responsibility to ensure that no code inside a target feature function (including inside a closure) runs after this (until the feature is enabled again). **Note:** this has an effect on existing code, as nowadays closures do not inherit features from the enclosing function, and thus this strengthens a safety requirement. It was originally proposed in rust-lang#73631 to solve this by adding a new type of UB: “taking a target feature away from your process after having run code that uses that target feature is UB” . This was motivated by userspace code already assuming in a few places that CPU features never disappear from a program during execution (see i.e. https://github.com/rust-lang/stdarch/blob/2e29bdf90832931ea499755bb4ad7a6b0809295a/crates/std_detect/src/detect/arch/x86.rs); however, concerns were raised in the context of the Linux kernel; thus, we propose to relax that requirement to "causing the set of usable features to be reduced is unsafe; when doing so, the programmer is required to ensure that no closures or safe fn pointers that use removed features are still in scope". * [Fix #[inline(always)] on closures with target feature 1.1 rust-lang#111836](rust-lang#111836) Closures accept `#[inline(always)]`, even within functions marked with `#[target_feature]`. Since these attributes conflict, `#[inline(always)]` wins out to maintain compatibility. ### ABI concerns * [The extern "C" ABI of SIMD vector types depends on target features rust-lang#116558](rust-lang#116558) The ABI of some types can change when compiling a function with different target features. This could have introduced unsoundness with target_feature_11, but recent fixes (rust-lang#133102, rust-lang#132173) either make those situations invalid or make the ABI no longer dependent on features. Thus, those issues should no longer occur. ### Special functions The `#[target_feature]` attribute is forbidden from a variety of special functions, such as main, current and future lang items (e.g. `#[start]`, `#[panic_handler]`), safe default trait implementations and safe trait methods. This was not disallowed at the time of the first stabilization PR for target_features_11, and resulted in the following issues/PRs: * [`#[target_feature]` is allowed on `main` rust-lang#108645](rust-lang#108645) * [`#[target_feature]` is allowed on default implementations rust-lang#108646](rust-lang#108646) * [#[target_feature] is allowed on #[panic_handler] with target_feature 1.1 rust-lang#109411](rust-lang#109411) * [Prevent using `#[target_feature]` on lang item functions rust-lang#115910](rust-lang#115910) ## Documentation * Reference: [Document the `target_feature_11` feature reference#1181](rust-lang/reference#1181) --- cc tracking issue rust-lang#69098 cc `@workingjubilee` cc `@RalfJung` r? `@rust-lang/lang`
Stabilize target_feature_11 # Stabilization report This is an updated version of rust-lang#116114, which is itself a redo of rust-lang#99767. Most of this commit and report were copied from those PRs. Thanks ``@LeSeulArtichaut`` and ``@calebzulawski!`` ## Summary Allows for safe functions to be marked with `#[target_feature]` attributes. Functions marked with `#[target_feature]` are generally considered as unsafe functions: they are unsafe to call, cannot *generally* be assigned to safe function pointers, and don't implement the `Fn*` traits. However, calling them from other `#[target_feature]` functions with a superset of features is safe. ```rust // Demonstration function #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn avx2() {} fn foo() { // Calling `avx2` here is unsafe, as we must ensure // that AVX is available first. unsafe { avx2(); } } #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn bar() { // Calling `avx2` here is safe. avx2(); } ``` Moreover, once rust-lang#135504 is merged, they can be converted to safe function pointers in a context in which calling them is safe: ```rust // Demonstration function #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn avx2() {} fn foo() -> fn() { // Converting `avx2` to fn() is a compilation error here. avx2 } #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn bar() -> fn() { // `avx2` coerces to fn() here avx2 } ``` See the section "Closures" below for justification of this behaviour. ## Test cases Tests for this feature can be found in [`tests/ui/target_feature/`](https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/tree/f6cb952dc115fd1311b02b694933e31d8dc8b002/tests/ui/target-feature). ## Edge cases ### Closures * [target-feature 1.1: should closures inherit target-feature annotations? rust-lang#73631](rust-lang#73631) Closures defined inside functions marked with #[target_feature] inherit the target features of their parent function. They can still be assigned to safe function pointers and implement the appropriate `Fn*` traits. ```rust #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn qux() { let my_closure = || avx2(); // this call to `avx2` is safe let f: fn() = my_closure; } ``` This means that in order to call a function with #[target_feature], you must guarantee that the target-feature is available while the function, any closures defined inside it, as well as any safe function pointers obtained from target-feature functions inside it, execute. This is usually ensured because target features are assumed to never disappear, and: - on any unsafe call to a `#[target_feature]` function, presence of the target feature is guaranteed by the programmer through the safety requirements of the unsafe call. - on any safe call, this is guaranteed recursively by the caller. If you work in an environment where target features can be disabled, it is your responsibility to ensure that no code inside a target feature function (including inside a closure) runs after this (until the feature is enabled again). **Note:** this has an effect on existing code, as nowadays closures do not inherit features from the enclosing function, and thus this strengthens a safety requirement. It was originally proposed in rust-lang#73631 to solve this by adding a new type of UB: “taking a target feature away from your process after having run code that uses that target feature is UB” . This was motivated by userspace code already assuming in a few places that CPU features never disappear from a program during execution (see i.e. https://github.com/rust-lang/stdarch/blob/2e29bdf90832931ea499755bb4ad7a6b0809295a/crates/std_detect/src/detect/arch/x86.rs); however, concerns were raised in the context of the Linux kernel; thus, we propose to relax that requirement to "causing the set of usable features to be reduced is unsafe; when doing so, the programmer is required to ensure that no closures or safe fn pointers that use removed features are still in scope". * [Fix #[inline(always)] on closures with target feature 1.1 rust-lang#111836](rust-lang#111836) Closures accept `#[inline(always)]`, even within functions marked with `#[target_feature]`. Since these attributes conflict, `#[inline(always)]` wins out to maintain compatibility. ### ABI concerns * [The extern "C" ABI of SIMD vector types depends on target features rust-lang#116558](rust-lang#116558) The ABI of some types can change when compiling a function with different target features. This could have introduced unsoundness with target_feature_11, but recent fixes (rust-lang#133102, rust-lang#132173) either make those situations invalid or make the ABI no longer dependent on features. Thus, those issues should no longer occur. ### Special functions The `#[target_feature]` attribute is forbidden from a variety of special functions, such as main, current and future lang items (e.g. `#[start]`, `#[panic_handler]`), safe default trait implementations and safe trait methods. This was not disallowed at the time of the first stabilization PR for target_features_11, and resulted in the following issues/PRs: * [`#[target_feature]` is allowed on `main` rust-lang#108645](rust-lang#108645) * [`#[target_feature]` is allowed on default implementations rust-lang#108646](rust-lang#108646) * [#[target_feature] is allowed on #[panic_handler] with target_feature 1.1 rust-lang#109411](rust-lang#109411) * [Prevent using `#[target_feature]` on lang item functions rust-lang#115910](rust-lang#115910) ## Documentation * Reference: [Document the `target_feature_11` feature reference#1181](rust-lang/reference#1181) --- cc tracking issue rust-lang#69098 cc ``@workingjubilee`` cc ``@RalfJung`` r? ``@rust-lang/lang``
Stabilize target_feature_11 # Stabilization report This is an updated version of rust-lang#116114, which is itself a redo of rust-lang#99767. Most of this commit and report were copied from those PRs. Thanks ```@LeSeulArtichaut``` and ```@calebzulawski!``` ## Summary Allows for safe functions to be marked with `#[target_feature]` attributes. Functions marked with `#[target_feature]` are generally considered as unsafe functions: they are unsafe to call, cannot *generally* be assigned to safe function pointers, and don't implement the `Fn*` traits. However, calling them from other `#[target_feature]` functions with a superset of features is safe. ```rust // Demonstration function #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn avx2() {} fn foo() { // Calling `avx2` here is unsafe, as we must ensure // that AVX is available first. unsafe { avx2(); } } #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn bar() { // Calling `avx2` here is safe. avx2(); } ``` Moreover, once rust-lang#135504 is merged, they can be converted to safe function pointers in a context in which calling them is safe: ```rust // Demonstration function #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn avx2() {} fn foo() -> fn() { // Converting `avx2` to fn() is a compilation error here. avx2 } #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn bar() -> fn() { // `avx2` coerces to fn() here avx2 } ``` See the section "Closures" below for justification of this behaviour. ## Test cases Tests for this feature can be found in [`tests/ui/target_feature/`](https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/tree/f6cb952dc115fd1311b02b694933e31d8dc8b002/tests/ui/target-feature). ## Edge cases ### Closures * [target-feature 1.1: should closures inherit target-feature annotations? rust-lang#73631](rust-lang#73631) Closures defined inside functions marked with #[target_feature] inherit the target features of their parent function. They can still be assigned to safe function pointers and implement the appropriate `Fn*` traits. ```rust #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn qux() { let my_closure = || avx2(); // this call to `avx2` is safe let f: fn() = my_closure; } ``` This means that in order to call a function with #[target_feature], you must guarantee that the target-feature is available while the function, any closures defined inside it, as well as any safe function pointers obtained from target-feature functions inside it, execute. This is usually ensured because target features are assumed to never disappear, and: - on any unsafe call to a `#[target_feature]` function, presence of the target feature is guaranteed by the programmer through the safety requirements of the unsafe call. - on any safe call, this is guaranteed recursively by the caller. If you work in an environment where target features can be disabled, it is your responsibility to ensure that no code inside a target feature function (including inside a closure) runs after this (until the feature is enabled again). **Note:** this has an effect on existing code, as nowadays closures do not inherit features from the enclosing function, and thus this strengthens a safety requirement. It was originally proposed in rust-lang#73631 to solve this by adding a new type of UB: “taking a target feature away from your process after having run code that uses that target feature is UB” . This was motivated by userspace code already assuming in a few places that CPU features never disappear from a program during execution (see i.e. https://github.com/rust-lang/stdarch/blob/2e29bdf90832931ea499755bb4ad7a6b0809295a/crates/std_detect/src/detect/arch/x86.rs); however, concerns were raised in the context of the Linux kernel; thus, we propose to relax that requirement to "causing the set of usable features to be reduced is unsafe; when doing so, the programmer is required to ensure that no closures or safe fn pointers that use removed features are still in scope". * [Fix #[inline(always)] on closures with target feature 1.1 rust-lang#111836](rust-lang#111836) Closures accept `#[inline(always)]`, even within functions marked with `#[target_feature]`. Since these attributes conflict, `#[inline(always)]` wins out to maintain compatibility. ### ABI concerns * [The extern "C" ABI of SIMD vector types depends on target features rust-lang#116558](rust-lang#116558) The ABI of some types can change when compiling a function with different target features. This could have introduced unsoundness with target_feature_11, but recent fixes (rust-lang#133102, rust-lang#132173) either make those situations invalid or make the ABI no longer dependent on features. Thus, those issues should no longer occur. ### Special functions The `#[target_feature]` attribute is forbidden from a variety of special functions, such as main, current and future lang items (e.g. `#[start]`, `#[panic_handler]`), safe default trait implementations and safe trait methods. This was not disallowed at the time of the first stabilization PR for target_features_11, and resulted in the following issues/PRs: * [`#[target_feature]` is allowed on `main` rust-lang#108645](rust-lang#108645) * [`#[target_feature]` is allowed on default implementations rust-lang#108646](rust-lang#108646) * [#[target_feature] is allowed on #[panic_handler] with target_feature 1.1 rust-lang#109411](rust-lang#109411) * [Prevent using `#[target_feature]` on lang item functions rust-lang#115910](rust-lang#115910) ## Documentation * Reference: [Document the `target_feature_11` feature reference#1181](rust-lang/reference#1181) --- cc tracking issue rust-lang#69098 cc ```@workingjubilee``` cc ```@RalfJung``` r? ```@rust-lang/lang```
Rollup merge of rust-lang#134090 - veluca93:stable-tf11, r=oli-obk Stabilize target_feature_11 # Stabilization report This is an updated version of rust-lang#116114, which is itself a redo of rust-lang#99767. Most of this commit and report were copied from those PRs. Thanks ```@LeSeulArtichaut``` and ```@calebzulawski!``` ## Summary Allows for safe functions to be marked with `#[target_feature]` attributes. Functions marked with `#[target_feature]` are generally considered as unsafe functions: they are unsafe to call, cannot *generally* be assigned to safe function pointers, and don't implement the `Fn*` traits. However, calling them from other `#[target_feature]` functions with a superset of features is safe. ```rust // Demonstration function #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn avx2() {} fn foo() { // Calling `avx2` here is unsafe, as we must ensure // that AVX is available first. unsafe { avx2(); } } #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn bar() { // Calling `avx2` here is safe. avx2(); } ``` Moreover, once rust-lang#135504 is merged, they can be converted to safe function pointers in a context in which calling them is safe: ```rust // Demonstration function #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn avx2() {} fn foo() -> fn() { // Converting `avx2` to fn() is a compilation error here. avx2 } #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn bar() -> fn() { // `avx2` coerces to fn() here avx2 } ``` See the section "Closures" below for justification of this behaviour. ## Test cases Tests for this feature can be found in [`tests/ui/target_feature/`](https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/tree/f6cb952dc115fd1311b02b694933e31d8dc8b002/tests/ui/target-feature). ## Edge cases ### Closures * [target-feature 1.1: should closures inherit target-feature annotations? rust-lang#73631](rust-lang#73631) Closures defined inside functions marked with #[target_feature] inherit the target features of their parent function. They can still be assigned to safe function pointers and implement the appropriate `Fn*` traits. ```rust #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn qux() { let my_closure = || avx2(); // this call to `avx2` is safe let f: fn() = my_closure; } ``` This means that in order to call a function with #[target_feature], you must guarantee that the target-feature is available while the function, any closures defined inside it, as well as any safe function pointers obtained from target-feature functions inside it, execute. This is usually ensured because target features are assumed to never disappear, and: - on any unsafe call to a `#[target_feature]` function, presence of the target feature is guaranteed by the programmer through the safety requirements of the unsafe call. - on any safe call, this is guaranteed recursively by the caller. If you work in an environment where target features can be disabled, it is your responsibility to ensure that no code inside a target feature function (including inside a closure) runs after this (until the feature is enabled again). **Note:** this has an effect on existing code, as nowadays closures do not inherit features from the enclosing function, and thus this strengthens a safety requirement. It was originally proposed in rust-lang#73631 to solve this by adding a new type of UB: “taking a target feature away from your process after having run code that uses that target feature is UB” . This was motivated by userspace code already assuming in a few places that CPU features never disappear from a program during execution (see i.e. https://github.com/rust-lang/stdarch/blob/2e29bdf90832931ea499755bb4ad7a6b0809295a/crates/std_detect/src/detect/arch/x86.rs); however, concerns were raised in the context of the Linux kernel; thus, we propose to relax that requirement to "causing the set of usable features to be reduced is unsafe; when doing so, the programmer is required to ensure that no closures or safe fn pointers that use removed features are still in scope". * [Fix #[inline(always)] on closures with target feature 1.1 rust-lang#111836](rust-lang#111836) Closures accept `#[inline(always)]`, even within functions marked with `#[target_feature]`. Since these attributes conflict, `#[inline(always)]` wins out to maintain compatibility. ### ABI concerns * [The extern "C" ABI of SIMD vector types depends on target features rust-lang#116558](rust-lang#116558) The ABI of some types can change when compiling a function with different target features. This could have introduced unsoundness with target_feature_11, but recent fixes (rust-lang#133102, rust-lang#132173) either make those situations invalid or make the ABI no longer dependent on features. Thus, those issues should no longer occur. ### Special functions The `#[target_feature]` attribute is forbidden from a variety of special functions, such as main, current and future lang items (e.g. `#[start]`, `#[panic_handler]`), safe default trait implementations and safe trait methods. This was not disallowed at the time of the first stabilization PR for target_features_11, and resulted in the following issues/PRs: * [`#[target_feature]` is allowed on `main` rust-lang#108645](rust-lang#108645) * [`#[target_feature]` is allowed on default implementations rust-lang#108646](rust-lang#108646) * [#[target_feature] is allowed on #[panic_handler] with target_feature 1.1 rust-lang#109411](rust-lang#109411) * [Prevent using `#[target_feature]` on lang item functions rust-lang#115910](rust-lang#115910) ## Documentation * Reference: [Document the `target_feature_11` feature reference#1181](rust-lang/reference#1181) --- cc tracking issue rust-lang#69098 cc ```@workingjubilee``` cc ```@RalfJung``` r? ```@rust-lang/lang```
Stabilize target_feature_11 # Stabilization report This is an updated version of rust-lang/rust#116114, which is itself a redo of rust-lang/rust#99767. Most of this commit and report were copied from those PRs. Thanks ```@LeSeulArtichaut``` and ```@calebzulawski!``` ## Summary Allows for safe functions to be marked with `#[target_feature]` attributes. Functions marked with `#[target_feature]` are generally considered as unsafe functions: they are unsafe to call, cannot *generally* be assigned to safe function pointers, and don't implement the `Fn*` traits. However, calling them from other `#[target_feature]` functions with a superset of features is safe. ```rust // Demonstration function #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn avx2() {} fn foo() { // Calling `avx2` here is unsafe, as we must ensure // that AVX is available first. unsafe { avx2(); } } #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn bar() { // Calling `avx2` here is safe. avx2(); } ``` Moreover, once rust-lang/rust#135504 is merged, they can be converted to safe function pointers in a context in which calling them is safe: ```rust // Demonstration function #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn avx2() {} fn foo() -> fn() { // Converting `avx2` to fn() is a compilation error here. avx2 } #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn bar() -> fn() { // `avx2` coerces to fn() here avx2 } ``` See the section "Closures" below for justification of this behaviour. ## Test cases Tests for this feature can be found in [`tests/ui/target_feature/`](https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/tree/f6cb952dc115fd1311b02b694933e31d8dc8b002/tests/ui/target-feature). ## Edge cases ### Closures * [target-feature 1.1: should closures inherit target-feature annotations? #73631](rust-lang/rust#73631) Closures defined inside functions marked with #[target_feature] inherit the target features of their parent function. They can still be assigned to safe function pointers and implement the appropriate `Fn*` traits. ```rust #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn qux() { let my_closure = || avx2(); // this call to `avx2` is safe let f: fn() = my_closure; } ``` This means that in order to call a function with #[target_feature], you must guarantee that the target-feature is available while the function, any closures defined inside it, as well as any safe function pointers obtained from target-feature functions inside it, execute. This is usually ensured because target features are assumed to never disappear, and: - on any unsafe call to a `#[target_feature]` function, presence of the target feature is guaranteed by the programmer through the safety requirements of the unsafe call. - on any safe call, this is guaranteed recursively by the caller. If you work in an environment where target features can be disabled, it is your responsibility to ensure that no code inside a target feature function (including inside a closure) runs after this (until the feature is enabled again). **Note:** this has an effect on existing code, as nowadays closures do not inherit features from the enclosing function, and thus this strengthens a safety requirement. It was originally proposed in #73631 to solve this by adding a new type of UB: “taking a target feature away from your process after having run code that uses that target feature is UB” . This was motivated by userspace code already assuming in a few places that CPU features never disappear from a program during execution (see i.e. https://github.com/rust-lang/stdarch/blob/2e29bdf90832931ea499755bb4ad7a6b0809295a/crates/std_detect/src/detect/arch/x86.rs); however, concerns were raised in the context of the Linux kernel; thus, we propose to relax that requirement to "causing the set of usable features to be reduced is unsafe; when doing so, the programmer is required to ensure that no closures or safe fn pointers that use removed features are still in scope". * [Fix #[inline(always)] on closures with target feature 1.1 #111836](rust-lang/rust#111836) Closures accept `#[inline(always)]`, even within functions marked with `#[target_feature]`. Since these attributes conflict, `#[inline(always)]` wins out to maintain compatibility. ### ABI concerns * [The extern "C" ABI of SIMD vector types depends on target features #116558](rust-lang/rust#116558) The ABI of some types can change when compiling a function with different target features. This could have introduced unsoundness with target_feature_11, but recent fixes (#133102, #132173) either make those situations invalid or make the ABI no longer dependent on features. Thus, those issues should no longer occur. ### Special functions The `#[target_feature]` attribute is forbidden from a variety of special functions, such as main, current and future lang items (e.g. `#[start]`, `#[panic_handler]`), safe default trait implementations and safe trait methods. This was not disallowed at the time of the first stabilization PR for target_features_11, and resulted in the following issues/PRs: * [`#[target_feature]` is allowed on `main` #108645](rust-lang/rust#108645) * [`#[target_feature]` is allowed on default implementations #108646](rust-lang/rust#108646) * [#[target_feature] is allowed on #[panic_handler] with target_feature 1.1 #109411](rust-lang/rust#109411) * [Prevent using `#[target_feature]` on lang item functions #115910](rust-lang/rust#115910) ## Documentation * Reference: [Document the `target_feature_11` feature reference#1181](rust-lang/reference#1181) --- cc tracking issue rust-lang/rust#69098 cc ```@workingjubilee``` cc ```@RalfJung``` r? ```@rust-lang/lang```
I'm not sure if people are aware, but The warnings look something like:
|
Oh, good point... I was about to make this a hard error, I guess then we would have noticed. ;) Cc @Amanieu looks like something is wrong with one of the intrinsics when building for |
Hm, but there are no SIMD types in the signature for any of these intrinsics. Very strange. |
#137092 helps figure out what is going on. :) rust/compiler/rustc_target/src/callconv/x86_win64.rs Lines 26 to 30 in 1f37b9a
This was added in #134290, Cc @tgross35. Surely on a target that does not have float or SIMD registers, i128 does not get passed in |
#137094 fixes most of the warnings. The remaining ones seem to be about U64x2 which indeed does not make sense as a type on a softfloat target; I created a separate issue for that: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#758. |
Stabilize target_feature_11 # Stabilization report This is an updated version of rust-lang/rust#116114, which is itself a redo of rust-lang/rust#99767. Most of this commit and report were copied from those PRs. Thanks ```@LeSeulArtichaut``` and ```@calebzulawski!``` ## Summary Allows for safe functions to be marked with `#[target_feature]` attributes. Functions marked with `#[target_feature]` are generally considered as unsafe functions: they are unsafe to call, cannot *generally* be assigned to safe function pointers, and don't implement the `Fn*` traits. However, calling them from other `#[target_feature]` functions with a superset of features is safe. ```rust // Demonstration function #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn avx2() {} fn foo() { // Calling `avx2` here is unsafe, as we must ensure // that AVX is available first. unsafe { avx2(); } } #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn bar() { // Calling `avx2` here is safe. avx2(); } ``` Moreover, once rust-lang/rust#135504 is merged, they can be converted to safe function pointers in a context in which calling them is safe: ```rust // Demonstration function #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn avx2() {} fn foo() -> fn() { // Converting `avx2` to fn() is a compilation error here. avx2 } #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn bar() -> fn() { // `avx2` coerces to fn() here avx2 } ``` See the section "Closures" below for justification of this behaviour. ## Test cases Tests for this feature can be found in [`tests/ui/target_feature/`](https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/tree/f6cb952dc115fd1311b02b694933e31d8dc8b002/tests/ui/target-feature). ## Edge cases ### Closures * [target-feature 1.1: should closures inherit target-feature annotations? #73631](rust-lang/rust#73631) Closures defined inside functions marked with #[target_feature] inherit the target features of their parent function. They can still be assigned to safe function pointers and implement the appropriate `Fn*` traits. ```rust #[target_feature(enable = "avx2")] fn qux() { let my_closure = || avx2(); // this call to `avx2` is safe let f: fn() = my_closure; } ``` This means that in order to call a function with #[target_feature], you must guarantee that the target-feature is available while the function, any closures defined inside it, as well as any safe function pointers obtained from target-feature functions inside it, execute. This is usually ensured because target features are assumed to never disappear, and: - on any unsafe call to a `#[target_feature]` function, presence of the target feature is guaranteed by the programmer through the safety requirements of the unsafe call. - on any safe call, this is guaranteed recursively by the caller. If you work in an environment where target features can be disabled, it is your responsibility to ensure that no code inside a target feature function (including inside a closure) runs after this (until the feature is enabled again). **Note:** this has an effect on existing code, as nowadays closures do not inherit features from the enclosing function, and thus this strengthens a safety requirement. It was originally proposed in #73631 to solve this by adding a new type of UB: “taking a target feature away from your process after having run code that uses that target feature is UB” . This was motivated by userspace code already assuming in a few places that CPU features never disappear from a program during execution (see i.e. https://github.com/rust-lang/stdarch/blob/2e29bdf90832931ea499755bb4ad7a6b0809295a/crates/std_detect/src/detect/arch/x86.rs); however, concerns were raised in the context of the Linux kernel; thus, we propose to relax that requirement to "causing the set of usable features to be reduced is unsafe; when doing so, the programmer is required to ensure that no closures or safe fn pointers that use removed features are still in scope". * [Fix #[inline(always)] on closures with target feature 1.1 #111836](rust-lang/rust#111836) Closures accept `#[inline(always)]`, even within functions marked with `#[target_feature]`. Since these attributes conflict, `#[inline(always)]` wins out to maintain compatibility. ### ABI concerns * [The extern "C" ABI of SIMD vector types depends on target features #116558](rust-lang/rust#116558) The ABI of some types can change when compiling a function with different target features. This could have introduced unsoundness with target_feature_11, but recent fixes (#133102, #132173) either make those situations invalid or make the ABI no longer dependent on features. Thus, those issues should no longer occur. ### Special functions The `#[target_feature]` attribute is forbidden from a variety of special functions, such as main, current and future lang items (e.g. `#[start]`, `#[panic_handler]`), safe default trait implementations and safe trait methods. This was not disallowed at the time of the first stabilization PR for target_features_11, and resulted in the following issues/PRs: * [`#[target_feature]` is allowed on `main` #108645](rust-lang/rust#108645) * [`#[target_feature]` is allowed on default implementations #108646](rust-lang/rust#108646) * [#[target_feature] is allowed on #[panic_handler] with target_feature 1.1 #109411](rust-lang/rust#109411) * [Prevent using `#[target_feature]` on lang item functions #115910](rust-lang/rust#115910) ## Documentation * Reference: [Document the `target_feature_11` feature reference#1181](rust-lang/reference#1181) --- cc tracking issue rust-lang/rust#69098 cc ```@workingjubilee``` cc ```@RalfJung``` r? ```@rust-lang/lang```
…r=tgross35 x86_win64 ABI: do not use xmm0 with softfloat ABI This adjusts rust-lang#134290 to not apply the new logic to targets marked as "softfloat". That fixes most instances of the issue brought up [here](rust-lang#116558 (comment)). r? `@tgross35`
Rollup merge of rust-lang#137094 - RalfJung:softfloat-means-no-simd, r=tgross35 x86_win64 ABI: do not use xmm0 with softfloat ABI This adjusts rust-lang#134290 to not apply the new logic to targets marked as "softfloat". That fixes most instances of the issue brought up [here](rust-lang#116558 (comment)). r? `@tgross35`
Removes an ABI hack that used `<2 x i64>` to return `i128` in `xmm0` on Windows [1]. [1]: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#759 Link: rust-lang#116558 Link: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#758
Update `compiler-builtins` to 0.1.147 Removes an ABI hack that used `<2 x i64>` to return `i128` in `xmm0` on Windows [1]. [1]: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#759 Link: rust-lang#116558 Link: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#758 try-job: x86_64-msvc-1 try-job: x86_64-msvc-2 try-job: x86_64-mingw-1 try-job: x86_64-mingw-2
Update `compiler-builtins` to 0.1.147 Removes an ABI hack that used `<2 x i64>` to return `i128` in `xmm0` on Windows [1]. [1]: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#759 Link: rust-lang#116558 Link: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#758 try-job: x86_64-mingw-1 try-job: x86_64-mingw-2
Removes an ABI hack that used `<2 x i64>` to return `i128` in `xmm0` on Windows [1]. [1]: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#759 Link: rust-lang#116558 Link: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#758
Update `compiler-builtins` to 0.1.147 Removes an ABI hack that used `<2 x i64>` to return `i128` in `xmm0` on Windows [1]. [1]: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#759 Link: rust-lang#116558 Link: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#758 try-job: x86_64-mingw-1 try-job: x86_64-mingw-2
Update `compiler-builtins` to 0.1.147 Removes an ABI hack that used `<2 x i64>` to return `i128` in `xmm0` on Windows [1]. [1]: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#759 Link: rust-lang#116558 Link: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#758 try-job: x86_64-mingw-1 try-job: x86_64-mingw-2
Rollup merge of rust-lang#137297 - tgross35:update-builtins, r=tgross35 Update `compiler-builtins` to 0.1.147 Removes an ABI hack that used `<2 x i64>` to return `i128` in `xmm0` on Windows [1]. [1]: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#759 Link: rust-lang#116558 Link: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#758 try-job: x86_64-mingw-1 try-job: x86_64-mingw-2
Update `compiler-builtins` to 0.1.147 Removes an ABI hack that used `<2 x i64>` to return `i128` in `xmm0` on Windows [1]. [1]: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#759 Link: rust-lang/rust#116558 Link: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#758 try-job: x86_64-mingw-1 try-job: x86_64-mingw-2
x86_win64 ABI: do not use xmm0 with softfloat ABI This adjusts rust-lang/rust#134290 to not apply the new logic to targets marked as "softfloat". That fixes most instances of the issue brought up [here](rust-lang/rust#116558 (comment)). r? `@tgross35`
Removes an ABI hack that used `<2 x i64>` to return `i128` in `xmm0` on Windows [1]. [1]: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#759 Link: rust-lang/rust#116558 Link: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#758
Update `compiler-builtins` to 0.1.147 Removes an ABI hack that used `<2 x i64>` to return `i128` in `xmm0` on Windows [1]. [1]: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#759 Link: rust-lang/rust#116558 Link: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#758 try-job: x86_64-mingw-1 try-job: x86_64-mingw-2
Removes an ABI hack that used `<2 x i64>` to return `i128` in `xmm0` on Windows [1]. [1]: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#759 Link: rust-lang#116558 Link: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#758
Removes an ABI hack that used `<2 x i64>` to return `i128` in `xmm0` on Windows [1]. [1]: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#759 Link: rust-lang#116558 Link: rust-lang/compiler-builtins#758
The following program has UB, for very surprising reasons:
The reason is that the ABI of the
__m256
type depends on the set of target features, so the caller (with_target_feature
) and callee (no_target_feature
) do not agree on how the argument should be passed. The result is a vector half-filled with junk. (The same issue also arises in the other direction, where the caller has fewer features than the callee: example here.)Currently, we have no good way to do correct code generation here. See #132865 for a discussion of how we could support such code in the future; it will require some non-trivial work. So instead, the current plan is to reject such code entirely.
This is the tracking issue for the lint that moves us in that direction. The hope is that passing SIMD vectors across a C ABI is sufficiently rare, and most of the cases being rejected have anyway already been broken, that we can reject this without much of an ecosystem impact. Crater showed no regressions.
This is linted against since Rust 1.84, and shown in future breakage reports starting with Rust 1.85. The plan is to move to a hard error with Rust 1.87.
When this becomes a hard error:
Original issue text:
I'm not sure if this is currently even properly documented? We are mentioning it in #115476 but the program above doesn't involve any function pointers so we really cannot expect people to be aware of that part of the docs. We show a general warning about the type not being FFI-compatible, but that warning shows up a lot and anyway in this case both caller and callee are Rust functions!
I think we need to do better here, but backwards compatibility might make that hard. @chorman0773 suggested we should just reject functions like
no_target_feature
that take an AVX type by-val without having declared the AVX feature. That seems reasonable; a crater run would be needed to assess whether it breaks too much code. An alternative might be to have a deny-by-default lint that very clearly explains what is happening.There are also details to work out wrt what exactly the lint should check. Newtypes around
__m256
will have the same problem. What about other larger types that contain__m256
? Behind a ptr indirection it's obviously fine, but what about(__m256, __m256)
? If we apply theScalarPair
optimization this will be passed in registers even on x86.A possible place to put the check could be somewhere around here.
In terms of process, I am not sure if an RFC is required; a t-compiler MCP might be sufficient. Currently we accept code that clearly doesn't do what it looks like it should do.
And finally -- are there any other targets (besides x86 and x86-64) that have target-features that affect the ABI? They should get the same treatment.
Note that this is different from #116344 in two ways:
__m256
by-pointer exactly to work-around this issue.)#[target_feature]
), the other issue comes about when the user disables features (which is only possible on a per-crate level via-C
, and if you're mixing crates with different-C
flags then you're already already on very shaky grounds -- we do that with std but nobody else really gets to do that, I think).Cc @workingjubilee more ABI fun ;)
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